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Abstract
We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time ad-
mits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has ﬁve ap-
pealing properties: (1) Trembling-hand perfectness - players do not use non-credible
threats; (2) Normal-form correlation - communication is required only before the
game starts; (3) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough
ﬁnite-horizon game and in any discounted game with high enough discount factor;
(4) Universal correlation device -the device does not depend on the speciﬁc parame-
ters of the game. (5) Canonical - the signal each player receives is equivalent to the
strategy he plays in equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Stopping games have been introduced by Dynkin ([7]) as a generalization of
optimal stopping problems, and later used in several models in economics,
management science, political science and biology, such as research and de-
velopment (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [10] and Mamer [14]), struggle of
survival among ﬁrms in a declining market (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [11],
Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ [12]), auctions (see e.g., Krishna and Morgan [13]),
lobbying (see e.g., Bulow and Klemperer [4]), and conﬂict among animals (see
e.g., Nalebuﬀ and Riley [19]).
1 This work is in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the Ph.D. in mathematics
at Tel-Aviv University. I would like to thank Eilon Solan for his careful supervision,
for the continuous help he oﬀered, and for many insightful discussions.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier June 10, 2009
In this paper we focus on (undiscounted) multi-player stopping games in dis-
crete time. The game is played by a ﬁnite set of players. There is an unknown
state variable, on which players receive symmetric partial information along
the game. At stage 1 all the players are active. At every stage n, each active
player declares, independently of the others, whether he stops or continues. A
player that stops at stage n, becomes passive for the rest of the game. The
payoﬀ of a player depends on the history of players' actions while he has been
active and on the state variable.
Much work has been devoted to the study of 2-player stopping games in dis-
crete time. This problem, when the payoﬀs have a special structure, was stud-
ied, among others, by Neveu ([21]), Mamer ([14]), Morimoto ([16]), Ohtsubo
([23]), Nowak and Szajowski ([22]), Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille ([25]), and
Neumann, Ramsey and Szajowski ([20]). Those authors provided various suﬃ-
cient conditions under which (Nash) -equilibria exist. Recently, Shmaya and
Solan ([28]) have proved the existence of (Nash) -equilibria assuming only
integrability of the payoﬀs. In contrast with the 2-player case, there is no
existence result for -equilibria in multi-player stopping games.
The equilibrium path of Nash equilibrium may be sustained by non-credible
threats of punishment. Since by punishing a deviator, some of the punishing
players may receive low payoﬀ (lower than if they do not punish the deviator),
it is not clear whether one should expect players to follow such an equilibrium.
Thus, a few papers study the stronger concept of perfect equilibrium (Selten
[26,27]) in 2-player stopping games (see for example, Fine and Li [8]).
Aumann ([1]) deﬁned the concept of correlated equilibrium in a ﬁnite normal-
form game as a Nash equilibrium in an extended game that includes a corre-
lation device, which sends to each player, before the start of play, a private
signal. The strategy of each player can then depend on the private signal that
he received. Correlated equilibria have a number of appealing properties. They
are computationally tractable. Existence is veriﬁed by checking a system of
linear inequalities rather than a ﬁxed point. The set of correlated equilib-
ria is closed and convex. Aumann ([2]) argues that it is the solution concept
consistent with the Bayesian perspective on decision making.
For sequential games, two main versions of correlated equilibrium have been
studied (see e.g., Forges [9]): normal-form correlated equilibrium, in which
each player receives only private signal before the game starts, and extensive-
form correlated equilibrium, in which each player receives a private signal at
each stage of the game. Note that every normal-form correlated equilibrium
is an extensive-form correlated equilibrium, but the converse is not true.
Communication between the players, that can lead to correlation of strategies,
is natural in many setups, for example: countries negotiate about their actions
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to each other and to other countries; ﬁrms decide on their strategies based on
common information such as past behavior of the market; and a manager
coordinates the actions taken by his subordinates. In some situations players
may coordinate before the play starts, but coordination along the play is costly
or impossible, and only the notion of normal-form correlated equilibrium is
appropriate. Two examples of such situations are:
• News playing among day traders - An announcement of macroeconomic
news is expected at a certain time. Empirical studies (see for example,
Christie-David, Chaudhry and KhanEconometrica [5]) show that several
minutes elapse before ﬁnancial instruments adjust to such announcements.
This gap of time may provide a chance for substantial proﬁt for quick trad-
ing. In this setup, the traders of a ﬁnancial institution can coordinate their
actions in advance. For example, they may decide that if the announcement
is of type a and the price of a certain ﬁnancial instrument increases by more
than b in the following 10 minutes, then certain buy and sell orders should
be made quickly. On the contrary, coordination along the play is costly due
to the time limit. Note that these traders may have diﬀerent payoﬀ func-
tions: each trader may be interested not only in the ﬁrm's proﬁt, but in the
part of the proﬁt that is made in ﬁnancial instruments that are under his
responsibility.
• War of attrition in nature, which is commonly modeled as a stopping game,
where normal-form (but not extensive-form) correlation devices are imple-
mented by evolution of phenotype roles (see e.g., Shmida and Peleg [29]).
A few papers have deﬁned and studied the properties of perfect correlated
equilibria in ﬁnite games, see e.g., Myerson ([17,18]) and Dhillon and Mertens
([6]). Generalizing the deﬁnition of the last paper, we deﬁne a (trembling-
hand) perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium, as a proﬁle where with probability
of at-least 1− δ, no player can earn more than  by deviating at any stage of
the game. 2 We hope that this deﬁnition, which has been adapted from may
be useful in future study of other dynamic games. 3
Our main result shows that for every δ,  > 0, a multi-player stopping game
admits a normal-form uniform perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium. Due to
the uniformness property, this equilibrium is an approximate equilibrium in
any long enough ﬁnite-horizon stopping game and in any discounted stopping
2 More formally, δ > 0 is an upper bound for the probability that the correlation
device sends signals in some setM ′ and for the probability that some event E occurs,
and  > 0 is the maximal proﬁt a player can earn by deviating at any stage of the
game and after any history of play, conditioned on that the state variable is not in
E and the signal proﬁle is not in M ′.
3 Our deﬁnition is similar to the notion of (sub-game) perfect (δ, )-equilibrium
presented in Mashiah-Yaakovi ([15]), where it is proven that such equilibrium exists
in multi-player stopping games where at any stage a single player is allowed to stop.
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game with high enough discount factor. 4 Moreover, the correlation device in
this equilibrium has two appealing properties: (1) Universality - the device
depends only on  and on the number of players. (2) Canonical - the signal
sent to each player is equivalent to the strategy he uses in equilibrium. 5
When the stopping game has special properties, we can further characterize
the approximate equilibrium, as discusses in Sect. 8.
The proof relies on two reductions: we ﬁrst deﬁne terminating games, as stop-
ping games that immediately end as soon as any player stops, and reduce the
problem of existence of equilibrium from general stopping games to terminat-
ing games. 6 This reduction requires us to use a universal correlation device
that is (δ, )-constant-expectation - the expected payoﬀ of a player almost does
not change when he receives his signal. Next, we use a stochastic variation of
Ramsey's theorem ([28]) to further reduce the problem to that of studying the
properties of correlated -equilibria in multi-player absorbing games 7 . The
study uses the result of Solan and Vohra [32] that any multi-player absorbing
game admits a correlated -equilibrium.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the result.
A sketch of the proof appears in Section 3. In Section 4 we reduce the problem
to existence of perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in terminating games with
special properties. Section 5 studies games played on ﬁnite trees. In Section
6 we use the stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which allows us to
construct a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in Section 7. In Sect. 8 we
discuss special properties of the approximate equilibrium in speciﬁc kinds of
stopping games.
4 Arguments in favor of the notion of uniform equilibrium can be found in Aumann
and Mashcler ([3]).
5 In sect. 2 we deﬁne a correlation device with a ﬁnite signal space, while the the
strategy space is inﬁnite. Thus the correlation device is not exactly canonical, but
it is closely-related to canonical representation: The signal informs each player at
which stages he should stop, conditioned on the information he has on the state of
nature and on the history of play, in any subtree where the players play a correlated
proﬁle. All of our results remain the same if one would use a canonical correlation
device with inﬁnite signal space.
6 In other papers, both games are referred to as stopping games. We have denoted
them by a diﬀerent name, because the reduction from stopping games to terminating
games is not trivial in our setup due to the requirement of normal-form correlation.
7 An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing state.
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2 Model and Main Result
Deﬁnition 1 A (multi-player) stopping game (in discrete time) is a 6-tuple
G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) where:
• I is a ﬁnite set of players;
• (Ω,A, p) is a probability space (the state space);
• F = (Fn)n≥0 is a ﬁltration over (Ω,A, p);
• R = (Rn)n≥0
⋃
R∞ is an F -adapted process:
· Let HSn denote the set of all histories of realized actions of each player
(stop or continue) until stage n, under the constraint that the members of
S always continue. The coordinates of Rn are denoted by RiS,n,hSn , where
n ∈ N, S ⊆ I is the set of players that stop at stage n, i ∈ S is a player,
and hSn ∈ HSn is the history of realized actions before stage n.
· Let HS∞ denote the set of all inﬁnite histories of realized actions, in which
the members of S always continue and all the members of I\S have
stopped. The coordinates of R∞ are denoted by RiS,∞,hS∞ where S ⊆ I
is the set of players who have never stopped, and hS∞ ∈ HS∞ is the inﬁnite
history of realized actions. Let nhS∞be the last stage in which a player stops
in hS∞. We require that R
i
S,∞,hS∞ is measurable in FnhS∞ , i.e., the payoﬀ of
a player who never stops changes only when other players stop.
A stopping game is played as follows. At stage 1 all players are active. At
each stage n, each active player is informed about Fn(ω), the minimal set in
Fn that includes the state ω ∈ Ω, and declares, independently of the others,
whether he stops or continues. An active player i that stops, becomes passive
for the rest of the game, and his payoﬀ is given by RiS,n,hSn ,, where i ∈ S ⊆ I
is the set of active players who stop at stage n, and hSn ∈ HSn is the history
of realized actions until stage n. If player i never stops, his payoﬀ is RiS,∞,hS∞
where i ∈ S ⊆ I is the set of players who never stop, and hS∞ is the inﬁnite
realized history of actions.
Deﬁnition 2 A (normal-form) correlation device is a pair D = (M,µ): (1)
M = (M i)i∈I , where M
i is a ﬁnite space of signals the device can send player
i. (2) µ ∈ 4 (M) is the probability distribution according to which the device
sends the signals to the players before the stopping game starts.
Given a correlation device D, we deﬁne an extended game G (D). The game
G (D) is played exactly as the game G, except that before the game starts, a
signal combination m = (mi)i∈I is drawn according to µ, and each player is
informed of mi. Then, each player may base his strategy on his signal.
For simplicity of notation, let the singleton coalition {i} be denoted as i,
and let −i = {I\i} denote the coalition of all the players besides player i.
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A (behavioral) strategy for player i ∈ I in G (D) is an F -adapted process
xi = (xin)n≥0, where x
i
n : (Ω×M i ×H in) → [0, 1]. The interpretation is that
xin (ω,m
i, hin) is the probability by which an active player i stops at stage
n after an history of play hin when he has received a signal m
i. A strategy
proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is completely mixed if at each stage, given any signal and
history of play, each player has a positive probability to stop and a positive
probability to continue. Formally: for each i ∈ I, mi ∈ M i, n ∈ N, and
hin ∈ H in: 0 < xin (ω,mi, hin) < 1
Let θi be the stage in which player i stops and let θi = ∞ if player i never
stops. If θi < ∞ let i ∈ Sθi ⊆ I be the coalition that stops at stage θi, and if
θi = ∞ let i ∈ Sθi ⊆ I be the coalition that never stops in the game. Let hθi
be the history of realized actions until stage θi. The expected payoﬀ of player
i under the strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is given by: γ




where the expectation Ex is with respect to (w.r.t.) the distribution Px over
plays induced by x. Given an event E ⊆ Ω, let γi (x| (E)) be the expected







The strategy xi is -best reply for player i when all his opponents follow x−i if
for every strategy of player i, yi: γi (x) ≥ γi (x−i, yi)− . Similarly, xi is -best
reply conditioned on E if γi (x | (E )) ≥ γi (x−i , y i | (E ))− . Let Hn denote the
set of all histories of realized actions before stage n, and Let Fˆn ⊆ Fn denote
the minimal sets in Fn: Fˆn =
{
Fn ∈ Fn|¬∃∅ 6= Fˆn ∈ Fn, s.t. Fˆn ( Fn
}
.
Let G(hn, Fn,D) be the induced stopping game that begins at stage n after,
an history of play hn has been played, and when the players are informed that
ω ∈ Fn ⊆ Fˆn. The active players when G(hn, Fn,D) starts, are those who have
not stopped in hn. For simplicity of notation, we use the same notation for a
strategy proﬁle in G (D) and for the induced strategy proﬁle in G(hn, Fn,D).
We now deﬁne a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G (D) be a stopping game, let E ⊆ Ω be an event, letM ′ ⊆
M be a set of signal proﬁles, and let  > 0. A strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is a
perfect -equilibrium of G (D) conditioned on Ω\E and given M\M ′, if there
exists a sequence (yk)k∈N=(y
i
k)k∈N,i∈I of completely mixed strategy proﬁles in
G (D), and a sequence (k)k∈N (0 < k < 1) converging to 0, such that for all
i ∈ I, m ∈ M\M ′, n ∈ N, hin ∈ H in, Fn ∈ Fˆn satisfying p ((Ω\E) |Fn) > 0, xi
is -best reply for player i ∈ I in the induced game G(hn, Fn,D) conditioned
on Ω\E, when all his opponents j ∈ −i use (1− k)xj + kyjk.
Deﬁnition 4 Let G (D) be a stopping game and let δ,  > 0. A proﬁle x =
(xi)i∈I is a perfect (δ, )-equilibrium of G (D) if there exists an event E ⊆ Ω
and a set of signal proﬁles M ′ ⊆M , such that p(E) < δ, µ(M ′) < δ, and x is
a perfect -equilibrium of G (D) conditioned on Ω\E and given M\M ′.
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Deﬁnition 5 Let G be a stopping game and let δ,  > 0. A perfect correlated
(δ, )-equilibrium is a pair (D, x) where D is a correlation device and x is a
perfect (δ, )-equilibrium in the extended game G (D).
Our main Result is the following:
Theorem 6 Let δ,  > 0 and let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a multi-player
stopping game such that supn∈(N
⋃
∞) ‖Rn‖∞ ∈ L1(p) (integrable payoﬀs).
Then for every δ,  > 0, G has a prefect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
Remark 7 The perfect correlated (, δ)-equilibrium that we construct is uni-
form in a strong sense: it is a (δ, 3)-equilibrium in every ﬁnite n-stage game,
provided that n is suﬃciently large. This can be seen by the construction itself
(Prop. 30) or by applying a general observation made by [30, Prop. 2.13].
Deﬁnition 8 A payoﬀ vector r ∈ R|I| is a (uniform) perfect correlated payoﬀ
if for every , δ, ′ > 0 there is a perfect correlated (, δ)-equilibrium x with a
payoﬀ r − ′ ≤ γ(x) ≤ r + ′.
Corollary 9 Any multi-player stopping game with integrable payoﬀs admits
a perfect correlated payoﬀ.
3 Sketch of the Proof
In this section we provide the main ideas of the proof. Let a terminating game
be a stopping game in which as soon as any player stops, the game terminates.
Let G be a terminating game. To simplify the presentation, assume that Fn is
trivial for every n, so that the payoﬀ process is deterministic, and that payoﬀs
are uniformly bounded by 1. For every two natural numbers k < l, deﬁne the
periodic game G(k, l) to be the game that starts at stage k and, if not stopped
earlier, restarts at stage l. Formally, the terminal payoﬀ at stage n in G(k, l)
is equal to the terminal payoﬀ at stage k + (nmod l − k) in G.
This periodic game is equivalent to an absorbing game, where each round of T
corresponds to a single stage of the absorbing game (a stochastic game with a
single non-absorbing state). Moreover, it has two special properties: It is recur-
sive (payoﬀ in the non-absorbing state is 0), and there is a unique action proﬁle
with a 0 absorbing probability. Solan and Vohra ([32, Prop. 4.10]) proved a
classiﬁcation result for absorbing games. Applying it to the two special prop-
erties yields that G(k, l) has one of the following: (1) A stationary absorbing
equilibrium. (2) A stationary non-absorbing equilibrium. (3) A correlated dis-
tribution η over the set of action proﬁles in which a single player stops. The
special properties of η allows to construct a correlated -equilibrium.
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Assign to each pair of non-negative integers k < l an element from a ﬁnite set
of colors c(k, l) that denotes which case of the classiﬁcation result holds and
an -approximation of the equilibrium payoﬀ. A consequence of Ramseyâs
theorem ([24]) is that there is an increasing sequence of integers 0 ≤ k1 <
k2 < ... such that c(k1, k2) = c(kj, kj+1) for every j.
Assume ﬁrst that k1 = 0. A perfect correlated 3-equilibrium is constructed
as follows. The construction depends on the case indicated by c(k1, k2). If the
case is 1 or 2, then between stages kj and kj+1 the players follow a periodic
(δ, )-equilibrium in the game G(kj, kj+1) with a payoﬀ in an  neighborhood of
the payoﬀ indicated by c(k1, k2). For this concatenated strategy to be a perfect
3-equilibrium in G in case 1, it is needed to verify that: (1) The equilibrium
in each G(k, l) is -perfect. (2) The game is absorbed with probability 1. This
is done by giving appropriate lower bounds to the stopping probability of each
G(kj, kj+1) in the ﬁrst round. If the case indicated by c(k1, k2) is 3, then we
adept the procedure presented by Solan and Vohra for the construction of
a correlated -equilibrium in a quitting game ([31, Section 4.2]). As part of
the adaptation we require the correlation device to be universal and (δ, )-
constant-expectation.
If k1 > 0, then Between stages 0 and k1, the players follow an equilibrium in
the k1-stage game with the terminal payoﬀ that is implied by c(k1, k2). From
stage k1 and on, the players follow the strategy described above. It is easy to
verify that this strategy proﬁle forms a 5-equilibrium.
We now consider a deterministic stopping game. Assume by induction that
any m-player stopping game admits a perfect correlated payoﬀ vector. Given
a stopping game G with m+ 1 players we construct an auxiliary terminating
game G′ with m + 1 players by setting the payoﬀ of a player i /∈ S when the
non-empty coalition S stops at stage n, as his perfect correlated payoﬀ in the
induced (m+ 1− |S|)-player game that begins at stage n + 1. The existence
of (δ, )-constant-expectation perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in G′ (with
a universal correlation device) implies naturally a similar equilibrium in G.
When the payoﬀ process is general, a periodic game is deﬁned now by two
stopping times µ1 < µ2: µ1 indicates the initial stage and µ2 indicates when
the game restarts. We analyze this kind of periodic games, by adapting the
methods presented in [28] for 2-player stopping games, and by using their
stochastic version of Ramsey's theorem.
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4 Reductions
In this section we make 3 reductions to the problem of existence of perfect cor-
related (δ, )-equilibrium in stopping games: (1) We reduce it to the problem
of existence of such equilibrium in terminating games. (2) We further reduce
it to the problem of existence of such an equilibrium in tree-like terminating
games with a ﬁnite-range payoﬀ process. (3) Finally, we reduce it to the prob-
lem of existence of such equilibrium in an induced game deep enough in the
tree, where with high probability each payoﬀ occurs inﬁnitely often or does
not occur at all. Thus, in the following sections we deal only with terminating
games with a ﬁnite-range payoﬀ process deep enough in the tree.
4.1 Terminating games
Deﬁnition 10 A terminating game is a 6-tuple G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) where:
• I is a ﬁnite set of players;
• (Ω,A, p) is a probability space;
• F = (Fn)n≥0 is a ﬁltration over (Ω,A, p);
• R = (Rn)n≥0 is an F -adapted R|I|·(2
|I|−1)-valued process. The coordinates
of Rn are denoted by RiS,nwhere i ∈ I and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
A terminating game is played as follows. At each stage n ∈ N, each player is
informed about Fn(ω), the minimal set in Fn that includes ω, and declares,
independently of the others, whether he stops or continues. If all players con-
tinue, the game continues to the next stage. If at-least one player stops, say a
coalition S ⊆ I, the game terminates, and the payoﬀ to player i is RiS,n. If no
player ever stops, the payoﬀ to everyone is zero.
A (behavioral) strategy for player i ∈ I in G (D) is an F -adapted process xi =
(xin)n≥0, where x
i
n : (Ω×M i) → [0, 1]. A perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium
and a perfect correlated payoﬀ vector are deﬁned in an analog way to Sec. 2.
A proﬁle x in G(D) is (δ, )-constant-expectation if with high probability the
expected payoﬀ of a player almost does not change when he obtains his signal.
Deﬁnition 11 Let G be a terminating game,  > 0, D = (M,µ) a correlation
device, and x a proﬁle in G(D) . The strategy proﬁle x is (δ, )-constant-
expectation if there is a set M ′ ⊆ M satisfying µ(M ′) ≤ δ, such that for
every player i ∈ I and every message mi ∈ (M\M ′)i: |γi(x|mi)− γi(x)| ≤ ,
where γi(x|mi) is the expected payoﬀ of player i where all players follow x,
conditioned on receiving a message mi.
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A (δ, )-constant-expectation proﬁle is similarly deﬁned for stopping games.
Consider a function that assigns a correlation device to each stopping game
(given  and δ). We say that the assigned correlation device is universal if it
depends only on the number of players and .
Deﬁnition 12 Let f be a function that assigns to each stopping (or terminat-
ing) game G and to each , δ > 0 a correlation device f(G, , δ) = D(G, , δ).
The function f is universal if the assigned correlation device depends only on
the number of players and : D(G, , δ) = D(|I| , ). Given such a function, we
call the the assigned device a universal (correlation) device.
The following proposition reduces the problem of existence of (δ, )-constant-
expectation perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium (with a universal device) in
stopping games to the problem of existence of such equilibrium in terminating
games.
Proposition 13 Assume that each terminating game with integrable payoﬀs
admits a (δ, )-constant-expectation perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium for
every δ,  > 0 with a universal correlation device. Then any stopping game G
with integrable payoﬀs admits such an equilibrium for every δ,  > 0.
PROOF. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of play-
ers. Let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a stopping game with m = |I| players. By
the induction hypothesis every stopping game with k < m players has a (δ, )-
constant-expectation perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium with a universal cor-
relation device D,k. For each induced stopping game G(hn, Fn,D,k) with k
players, let xhn,Fn,D,k be a (δ, )-constant-expectation perfect correlated (δ, )-
equilibrium with a payoﬀ of vhn,Fn,D,k . We deﬁne an auxiliary terminating





is deﬁned as follows for each n ∈ N and Fn ∈ Fˆn:
• For each i ∈ S ⊆ I: R‘iS,n(Fn) = RiS,n,hIn − RiI,∞,hI∞ , where hIn is the history
of realized actions, in which all players continue at all stages before stage n.
• For each i /∈ S ⊂ I: R‘iS,n(Fn) = vih(I\S)∗n+1 ,Fn,D,|I\S| −R
i
I,∞,hI∞ , where h
(I\S)∗
n+1 is
the history of realized actions, in which all the players continue at all stages
before stage n, and the players in S stop at stage n.
The terminating game G′ has a (δ, )-constant-expectation perfect correlated





Let D,m = D′,m ×
∏
k<mD,k, and let the proﬁle x in G(D,m) be as follows:





S ⊆ I stops at stage n. The construction of x implies that it is a (δ, )-
constant-expectation perfect correlated
(
2|I| · δ, 
)
-equilibrium in G with a
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universal correlation device.
4.2 Tree-like stopping game
Deﬁnition 14 A terminating game G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) is tree-like if for
every n ∈ N , |Fn| <∞.
Shmaya and Solan prove ([28, Sec. 6]) that any 2-player terminating game
can be approximated by tree-like terminating games. With minor changes,
the proof can be adapted for multi-player terminating games, and for normal-
form perfect correlated equilibria. This implies the following lemma (the proof
is omitted):
Lemma 15 Assume that each tree-like terminating game with integrable pay-
oﬀs admits a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium for every δ,  > 0. Then any
terminating game with integrable payoﬀs admits such an equilibrium ∀δ,  > 0.
4.3 The Induced Game G(F,D)




∥∥∥Rn − R˜n∥∥∥∞) < , every perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in the
terminating game G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) is a (δ, 3)-equilibrium in the ter-
minating game G˜ =
(
I,Ω,A, p,F , R˜
)
. Hence we can assume w.l.o.g. that the
payoﬀ process R is uniformly bounded and that its range is ﬁnite. Actually, we





















be the set of all possible one-stage
payoﬀ matrices of the terminating game G. Let Rn(ω) be the payoﬀ matrix
at stage n. Let τ : Ω → N a bounded terminating time. Let partition Fˆτ be:
Fˆτ = ⋃n∈N {Fn ∈ Fˆn|∃ω, s.t. τ(ω) = n, Fn(ω) = Fn}
Given any payoﬀ matrix d ∈ D, let Ad ⊆ ∨n∈NFn be the event that d occurs
inﬁnitely often: Ad = {ω ∈ Ω|i.o. Rn(ω) = d}, and let Bd,k ⊆ ∨n∈NFn be the
event that d never occurs after stage k : Bd,k = {ω ∈ Ω|∀n ≥ k, Rn(ω) 6= d}.
Since all Ad and Bd,k are in
∨Fn
n∈N






(1) For each d ∈ D: A¯d ⋂ B¯d = ∅ and (A¯d ⋃ B¯d) = Ω.

















ω ∈ A¯d|ω /∈ Ad
}⋃{
ω ∈ B¯d|ω /∈ Bd,N0
})
. Observe that p(E) <
δ
3
. For any F ∈ F letDF =
{
d ∈ D|F ∈ A¯d
}





Let G(Fn,D) be the induced terminating game that begins at stage n when
the players are informed that ω ∈ Fn. The following lemma is standard.
Lemma 16 Let G be a tree-like terminating game, δ,  > 0, D = (M,µ)
a correlation device, M ′ ⊆ M a set of signals s.t. µ(M ′) ≤ δ, τ a bounded
stopping time, and E ⊆ Ω an event with p(E) < δ. Assume ∀F ∈ Fτ satisfying
p ((Ω\E) |Fn) > 0, there is a (δ, )-constant-expectation perfect correlated
(δ, )-equilibrium xF of G(F,D) conditioned on Ω\E and given M\M ′. Then
G admits a perfect correlated (2 · δ, 3 · )-equilibrium with a universal device.
PROOF. It is well known that any ﬁnite-stage game admits a 0-equilibrium
(see, e.g., [25, Prop. 3.1]). Since τ is bounded, p(E) ≤ δ and µ(M ′) ≤ δ, the
following strategy proﬁle x is a (2 · δ, 3 · )-equilibrium in G(D):
• Until stage τ , play a 0-equilibrium in the game that terminates at τ , if no
player stops before that stage, with a terminal payoﬀ γi(xF ) where F =
Fτ(ω) (ω) ∈ Fˆτ .
• If the game has not terminated by stage τ , play from that stage on the
proﬁle xF in G(F,D).
5 Terminating Games on Finite trees
An important building block in our analysis is terminating games that are
played on ﬁnite trees. In this section we deﬁne these games. discuss their
equivalence with absorbing games, and study some of their properties.
5.1 Finite trees
Deﬁnition 17 A terminating game on a ﬁnite tree (or simply a game on a
tree) is a tuple T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, Vstop, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
, where:
• I is a ﬁnite non-empty set of players.
•
(
V, Vleaf , r, (Cv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
is a tree, V is a nonempty ﬁnite set of nodes,
Vleaf ⊆ V is a nonempty set of leaves, r ∈ V is the root, and for each
v ∈ V \Vleaf , Cv ⊆ V \ {r} is the nonempty set of children of v. We denote
by V0 = V \Vleaf the set of nodes which are not leaves.
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• Vstop ⊆ V0 is the set of nodes the players can choose to stop in. Observe
that players can not stop at the leaves.
and for every v ∈ V0:





i∈I,∅6=S⊆I ∈ D is the payoﬀ matrix at v if a nonempty coalition
S stops at that node.
A terminating game on a ﬁnite tree starts at the root and is played in stages.
Given the current node v ∈ Vstop, and the sequence of nodes already visited,
the players decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stop or to
continue. Let S be the set of players that decide to stop. If S 6= ∅, the play
terminates and the terminal payoﬀ to each player i is Riv,S. If S = ∅, a new
node v ∈ CV is chosen according to ps . The process now repeats itself, with
v being the current node. If v ∈ V \Vstop then the players can not stop at that
stage, and a new node v ∈ CV is chosen according to pv. If v ∈ Vleaf then the
new current node is the root r. The game on the tree is essentially played in
rounds, where each round starts at the root and ends once it reaches a leaf.
A stationary strategy of player i is a function xi : VStop → [0, 1]; xi(v) is
the probability that player 1 stops at v. Let ci be the strategy of player i that
never stops, and let c = (ci)i∈I . Given a stationary strategy proﬁle x = (x
i)i∈I ,
Let γiT (x) = γ
i(x) be the expected payoﬀ under x, and let piT (x) = pi(x) the
probability that the game is stopped at the ﬁrst round (before reaching a leaf).
Deﬁnition 18 A proﬁle of stationary strategies x = (xi)i∈I is an -equilibrium
of the game on a tree T if, for each player i ∈ I, and for each strategy yi,
γi (x) > γi (x−i, yi)− .
Assuming no player ever stops, the collection (pv)v∈V0 of probability distri-
butions at the nodes induces a probability distribution over the set of leaves
or, equivalently, over the set of branches that connect the root to the leaves.
For each set Vˆ ⊆ V0, we denote by pVˆ the probability that the chosen branch
passes through Vˆ . For each v ∈ V , we denote by Fv the event that the chosen
branch passes through v.
We ﬁnish this subsection by deﬁning the game on a ﬁnite tree Tn,σ(F ). The
game begins at stage n, when ω ∈ F ⊆ Fˆn is randomly chosen (according
to p|F ). If the game has not absorbed before reaching stage τ(n), the game
restarts at stage n again (and a new ω ∈ F ⊆ Fˆn is randomly chosen).
Deﬁnition 19 Let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a tree-like terminating game,
n ∈ N a number, n < τ a bounded terminating time, and F ∈ Fˆn. The game
on the ﬁnite tree Tn,τ (F ) is
(




• V = ⋃ ω∈F
n≤k≤τ(ω)
{Fk(ω)}, Vleaf = ⋃
ω∈F
{Fτ (ω)}, r = F , Vstop = {v ∈ V |dv ∈ DF}
• Rv,Cv, pv are deﬁned by induction. Assume that v ∈ V \Vleaf and v ∈ Fˆk
for some n ≤ k, then: Rv = Rn(v), Cv =
{
Fk+1 ∈ Fˆk+1|Fk+1 ⊆ v
}
, and
pv(Fk+1) = p (Fk+1|v).
5.2 Equivalence with Absorbing Games
A terminating game on a ﬁnite tree T is equivalent to an absorbing game,
where each round of T corresponds to a single stage of the absorbing game.
An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing state.
As an absorbing game, the game T has two special properties: (1) It is a
recursive game: the payoﬀ in the non-absorbing state is zero; (2) There is a
unique action proﬁle that is non-absorbing.
Adapting [32]'s Prop. 4.10 to the two special properties gives the following:
Deﬁnition 20 Let T be a game on a tree, and i ∈ I a player. gi = maxv∈Vstop(
Rii,v
)
is the maximal payoﬀ a player can get in T by stopping alone. Let v˜i
be a node that maximizes the last expression, and let dv˜i ∈ D be the payoﬀ
matrix in that stage. 8
Proposition 21 Let T be a game on a ﬁnite tree. T has one of the following:
(1) A stationary absorbing equilibrium x 6= c.
(2) For each player i ∈ I and for each node v ∈ Vstop, : Rii,v ≤ 0. This implies
that c is a perfect stationary equilibrium.
(3) There is a distribution η ∈ ∆(I × {v˜i}) such that:
(a)
∑
i∈I Pη(v˜i, i) = 1.
(b) For each player j ∈ I : ∑i∈I Pη(v˜i, i) ·Rj{i},v˜i ≥ gj.
(c) Let the players i ∈ I that satisfy Pη(v˜i, i) > 0 be denoted as the
stopping players. For every stopping player i ∈ I there exists a player
ji 6= i, the punisher of i, such that: gi ≥ Ri{ji},v˜ji .
When we want to emphasize the dependency of these variables on the game
T, we write giT , v˜
i
T , ηT , xT . The equilibrium in case 1 may not be perfect, as
players may use non-credible threats after of-equilibrium path. The following
lemma asserts that a perfect -equilibrium exists.
8 Originally part 3 of Prop. 21 requires that every player would have a unique
pure action that maximizes his payoﬀ, conditioned on that the other players always
continue. This can be achieved by small perturbations on the payoﬀs (o ()), such
that Ri
i,v˜i
is strictly larger than any other payoﬀ Rii,v where v ∈ Vstop.
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Lemma 22 In case 1 of prop. 21, T admits a stationary absorbing perfect
-equilibrium x 6= c.
PROOF. Let T be a perturbed version of the game on a tree T : In T
when a non-empty coalition stops at some node, there is a probability 2 that
the stopping is ignored, and the game continues to the next stage, as if no
player has stopped. In T under any proﬁle x, any node is reached with a
positive probability, thus non-credible threats cannot be used in a stationary
equilibrium. If case 1 of prop. 21 applies, then T admits a perfect stationary
equilibrium x, and x is a perfect stationary absorbing -equilibrium in T.
5.3 Limits on Per-Round Probability of Termination
In this subsection we bound the probability of termination in a single round
when a stationary equilibrium x 6= c exists (case 1 of Prop. 21), by adapting to
the multi-player case the methods presented in [28, Subsec. 5.2] for two players.
We ﬁrst bound the probability of termination in a single round when the -
equilibrium payoﬀ is low for at least one player. The lemma is an adaptation
of Lemma 5.3 in [28], and the proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Lemma 23 Let G be a terminating game, n ∈ N , σ > n a bounded stopping
time, F ∈ Fˆn, and  > 0. Let x 6= c be a stationary 2-equilibrium in Tn,σ(F )
such that there exists a player i ∈ I with a low payoﬀ: γi(x) ≤ αiF − .
Then pi(ci, x−i) ≥ 
6







probability that if all the players never stop, the game visits a node v ∈ Vstop
with Ri{i},v = α
i
F in the ﬁrst round.
Deﬁnition 24 Let T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, Vstop, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V0
)
and let T ′ =(
I , V ′, V ′leaf , r








be two games on trees. We say that T ′
is a subgame of T if: V ′ ⊆ V , V ′stop = Vstop
⋂
V ′, r′ = r, and for every v ∈ V ′0 ,
C ′v = Cv, p
′
v = pv and R
′
v = Rv.
In words, T ′ is a subgame of T if we remove all the descendants (in the
strict sense) of several nodes from the tree
(
V, Vleaf , r, (Cv)v∈V0
)
and keep all
other parameters ﬁxed. Observe that this notion is diﬀerent from the standard
deﬁnition of a subgame in game theory.
Let T be a game on a tree. For each subset D ⊆ V0, we denote by TD the sub-
game of T generated by trimming T from D downward. Thus, all descendants
of nodes in D are removed. For every subgame T ′ of T and every subgame




be the probability that the chosen branch in
T passes through a leaf of T ′′ strictly before it passes through a leaf of T ′.
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The following deﬁnition divides the sets in Fˆn into 2: simple and complicated.
Deﬁnition 25 Let G be a terminating game,  > 0, and N0 ≤ n ∈ N. The
set F ∈ Fˆn is -simple if one of the following holds:
(1) For every i ∈ I: αiF < 0. or
(2) There is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(DF × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
(a) θ(d, i) > 0⇒ Ri{i},d = αiF . and
(b) αiF +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DF
θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiF − .
F is simple if it is -simple for every  > 0. F is complicated if it is not simple,
i.e.: there is an 0 > 0 such that F is not 0-simple. In that case we say that
F is complicated w.r.t. 0. Observe that Fn ∈ Fˆn is -simple if and only if
FN0 ∈ FˆN0 is -simple (where n > N0 and Fn ⊆ FN0).
The next proposition analyzes stationary −equilibria that yield a high payoﬀ
to all the players. The proposition is an adaptation of Prop. 5.5 in [28, Sec.
8]. The proof is omitted as the changes compared with [28] are minor.
Proposition 26 Let G be a terminating game, N0 ≤ n ∈ N , σ > n a
bounded stopping time, F ∈ Fˆn a complicated set (w.r.t. 0),  << 0|I|·|D| ,
and for each i ∈ I let ai ≥ αiF − . Then there exists a set U ⊆ V0 of nodes
and a strategy proﬁle x in T = Tn,σ(F ) such that:
(1) No subgame of TU has an -equilibrium with a corresponding payoﬀ in∏
i∈I
[ai, ai + ]
(2) Either: (a) U = ∅ (so that TU = T ) or (b) x is a 9-equilibrium in T,
and for every i ∈ I and for every strategy yi: ai−  ≤ γi(x), γi(x−i, yi) ≤
ai + 8, and pi(x) ≥ 2 · pTU ,T .
6 The Use of Ramsey Theorem
In this section we use a stochastic variation of Ramsey theorem ([24,28]), to
disassemble an inﬁnite terminating game into games on ﬁnite trees with special
properties. We begin by deﬁning an F -consistent C-valued NT-function.
Deﬁnition 27 An NT -function is a function that assigns to every integer
n > 0 and every bounded stopping time τ an Fn-measurable r.v. that is
deﬁned over the set {τ > n}. We say that an NT -function f is C -valued,
for some ﬁnite set C, if the r.v. fn,τ is C -valued, for every n > 0 and every
bounded stopping time τ .
Deﬁnition 28 An NT -function f is F-consistent if for every n > 0, every
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Fn-measurable set F, and every two stopping times τ1, τ2, we have: τ1 = τ2 > n
on F implies fn,σ1 = fn,σ2 on F.
Where A holds on B (A,B ∈ F) iﬀ p(Ac ⋂B) = 0.When f is an NT -function,
and τ1 < τ2 are two bounded stopping times we denote fτ1,τ2(ω) = fτ1(ω),τ2(ω).
Thus fτ1,τ2 is an Fn-measurable random variable. Shmaya and Solan proved
the following proposition ([28, Theorem 4.3]):
Proposition 29 For every ﬁnite set C, every C -valued F-consistent NT -
function f, and every  > 0, there exists an increasing sequence of bounded
stopping times 0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < ... such that: p (fσ1,σ2 = fσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1−.
In the rest of this section we provide an algorithm that attaches a color cn,σ(F )
and several numbers (λj,n,σ(F ))j for every F ∈ Fˆn, s.t. cn,σ(F ) is a C -valued
F-consistent NT -function.
A (hyper)-rectangle ([ai, ai + ])i∈I is bad if for every i ∈ I, αiF −  ≤ ai. It is
good if there exists a player i ∈ I such that ai +  ≤ αiF − . Let W be a ﬁnite
covering of [−1, 1]|I| with (not necessarily disjoint) rectangles ([ai, ai + ])i∈I ,
all of which are either good or bad. Let B = {b1, b2, ..., bJ} be the set of bad
rectangles in W and let O = {o1, o2, ..., oK} the set of good rectangles.
Set C = (simple
⋃
allbad
⋃ {1×O}⋃ {2}⋃ {3×W ×W}). Let G be a ter-
minating game, n ∈ N , σ > n a bounded stopping time, and F ∈ Fˆn.
If F is simple we let cn,σ(F ) = simple. Otherwise, F is complicated w.r.t.
to some 0(F ). In that case we assume that from now we ﬁx ε on that
0 <  << minF∈FˆN0
0(F )
|I|·|D| . The color cn,σ(F ) is determined as follows:
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• Set T (0) = Tn,σ(F ).







to obtain a subgame T (j) of T (j−1) and strategy proﬁle xj
in T (j) such that:
(1) No subgame of T (j) has a stationary -equilibrium with a corresponding
payoﬀ in hj.
(2) Either T (j) = T (j−1) or the following three conditions hold:
(a) For every i ∈ I, aij −  ≤ γi(xj).
(b) For every i ∈ I and every strategy yi: γi(x−ij , yi) ≤ aij + 8.
(c) pi (xj) ≥ 2 × pT (j),T (j−1) .
• If T (J) is trivial (the only node is the root), set cn,σ(F ) = allbad; otherwise
due to Prop. 21 and our procedure one of the following holds:
(1) T (J) has a perfect stationary absorbing -equilibrium x, with a payoﬀ γ(x)
in one of the good hyper-rectangles. Let cn,σ(F ) = (1, ol), where ol is the
9 The procedure is an adaptation of the 2-player procedure described in [28, Sec. 5]
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good rectangle that includes γx .
(2) T (J) has a perfect stationary non-absorbing equilibrium c, with a payoﬀ
0. Let cn,σ(F ) = (2).
(3) There is a correlated strategy proﬁle η ∈ ∆(A) in T (J) that satisﬁes
3(a)+3(b)+3(c) in Prop. 21. Let cn,σ(F ) = (3, w1, w2) where w1 is the
hyper-rectangle that includes γT (J)(η), and w2 is the hyper-rectangle that
includes g(T (J)).
The strategy proﬁles xJ , as given by Prop. 21, are strategies in T (j−1). We
consider them as strategies in T by letting them continue from the leaves of
T (j−1) downward. We deﬁne, for every j ∈ J , λj,n,σ(F ) = pT (j),T (j−1) .
By Prop. 29 there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times
0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < ... such that: p (cσ1,σ2 = cσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1 − δ3 . For every
F ∈ Fˆσ1 , let cF = cσ1,σ2(F ).
































j∈J ∈ FN1 s.t.: (1) For






6·|J | . From now on, we assume w.l.o.g. that σ1 ≥ N1.



























ω ∈ Ω|∃n s.t. cσn,σn+1 (ω) 6= c1,2 (ω)
}
7 Approximate Constant-Expectation Perfect Correlated Equilib-
rium
We ﬁnish the proof of the main theorem by the following proposition:
Proposition 30 Let G be a tree-like terminating game, let , δ > 0, let the
event E ′ ⊆ Ω and σ1 be deﬁned as in the previous subsection, and let F ∈ Fˆσ1.
Then there is a universal correlation device D = (M,µ) and a strategy proﬁle
xF in the game G(F,D), such that xF is a perfect (δ, )-constant-expectation
-equilibrium in the game G(F,D) conditioned on Ω\E and given M\M ′.
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PROOF. The proof is divided to a few cases according to the color of cF and
whether F ∈ A¯∞,j. The ﬁrst 3 cases adapts the methods of [28, Sec.7].
7.1 There exists j ∈ J s.t. F ∈ A¯∞,j
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ J be the smallest index such that F ∈ A¯∞,j. Let xj,σk,σk+1 be the
jth proﬁle in the procedure described in Section 6, when applied to Tσk,σk+1 .
Let xF be the following strategy proﬁle in G (F,D): between σk and σk+1 play
according to xj,σk,σk+1 . The procedure of Section 6 implies the following:
• Conditioned on that the game was absorbed between σk and σk+1 the proﬁle
xj,σk,σk+1 gives each player a payoﬀ: a
i
j −  ≤ γiσk,σk+1(xj) ≤ aij + 8.
• For each player i ∈ I and for each strategy yi in Tσk,σk+1 : (1) γiσk,σk+1(x−ij , yi) ≤
aij + 8. (2) piσk,σk+1(xj) ≥ 2 × λj(Tσk,σk+1)
Those facts that outside E ′ the game is absorbed with probability 1, and that
xF is a 11-equilibrium conditioned on Ω\E ′ . Observe that cF = allbed implies
that there exists j ∈ J such that F ∈ A¯∞,j.
7.2 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = 2
Let xF be the proﬁle in which everyone continues. It is implied that no player
can proﬁt more than  by deviating at any stage, conditioned on Ω\E ′.
7.3 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = (1, ok) ∈ (1×O)
Let xσk,σk+1 be a stationary absorbing equilibrium in T
(J) with a payoﬀ γσk,σk+1




w + ]. As ow is good, there is a
player i ∈ I s.t.: aiw ≤ αiF − 2. Let xF be the following strategy proﬁle
in GF : between σk and σk+1 play according to xσk,σk+1 . Lemma 23 implies
that pi(ci, x−iσk,σk+1) ≥ 6 · qiσk,σk+1 , where qiσk,σk+1 = p(∃σk ≤ n < σk+1, Rii,n =
αiF , R
i






. This implies that under xF the game is absorbed with probability 1, and
that xF is a 4-equilibrium in G, conditioned on Ω\E ′.
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7.4 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = (1,mw,mw′) ∈ (1×W ×W )
The construction in this case is as an adaptation of the procedure of [31],
which deals with quitting games (stationary terminating games where payoﬀ
is the same at all stages). Let η = ησ1,σ2 be a correlated strategy proﬁle
in Tσ1,σ2 that satisﬁes 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) in Prop. 21. The deﬁnition of α
i
F
implies that αiF = g
i(Tσ1,σ2) ∈ wik′ . This implies that there is a distribution
θ = θ(η) ∈ ∆(DF × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
(1) θ(d, i) > 0 ⇒ Rii,d = αiF , ∀d′ 6= d ∈ DF , θ(d′, i) = 0. Let d(i) ∈ DF be
the payoﬀ satisfying θ(di, i) > 0. If no such payoﬀ exists, let d(i) = ∅.
(2)
∑
j∈I, d∈DF θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiF
(3) If there is d ∈ DF such that θ(d, i) > 0, then there exists a punisher
ji ∈ I such that: d(ji) 6= ∅ and d(ji)iji ≤ αiF .
Let ζ ∈ ∆(I) be: ζ(i) = η(d(i), i). Let (τ ik)i∈I.k=1..∞ be an increasing sequence
of stopping times deﬁned by induction: τ i01 is the ﬁrst stage n such that Rn =
d(i0). τ
i0
n+1 is the ﬁrst stage m > max
i∈I
(τ in) such that Rm = d(i0). Observe
that in Ω\E ′ each τ in < ∞. We now describe the correlation device DDF =
(MDF , µDF ). Let M
i
DF
= {1, ..., Tˆ + T + 1}, where T ∈ N is suﬃciently large,
and Tˆ >> T . Let µDF be as follows:





(2) The quitter i ∈ I is chosen according to ζ. Player i receives signal lˆ.
(3) A number l ∈ N is chosen uniformly over
{
lˆ + 1, lˆ + T
}
(4) Player ji, the punisher of player i, receives the signal l.
(5) Each other player i˜ 6= i, j receives the signal l + 1.
Let M ′DF ⊆MDF be those signal proﬁles in which some of the players receive
an extreme signal: relative close to 1 or to Tˆ + T . If T, Tˆ are large enough,
we can assume that µ(M ′DF ) ≤ δ2D . Deﬁne now the following strategy xiF for
each player i ∈ I: let mi be the signal of player i. Player i stops at stages τn
that satisfy: n = (mi) mod Tˆ +T + 1, 10 and continues in all other stages. Let
the universal correlation device D = (M,µ) be the Cartesian multiplication:
D = ∏DF⊆DDDF . Similarly let M ′ = ∏DF⊆DM ′DF . Observe that µ (M ′) ≤ δ.
If the players follow the strategy proﬁle xF then the game is absorbed with
probability 1 conditioned on Ω\E ′ and the expected payoﬀ satisﬁes αiF ≤
γiF (x) ∈ miw . Moreover, if Tˆ >> T , then immediately after receiving his
signal mi (assuming m ∈ M\M ′) no player can infer from his signal whether
10On equilibrium path the player stops at stage τn. The requirement to stop at later
stages where n = (mi) mod Tˆ+T+1 is needed to satisfy the perfection requirement.
20
or not he is the quitter, thus xF is (δ, )-constant-expectation.
We now verify that if T, Tˆ are suﬃciently large, no player can gain too much
by deviating at any stage of the game conditioned on that ω ∈ Ω\E ′ and
given m ∈M\M ′. First, the probability the quitter i ∈ I correctly guesses the
punishment stage is very low, and thus he cannot proﬁt too much by deviating.
Similarly, any other player (j 6= i ∈ I) has a low probability to correctly guess
τ i
lˆ
, the stage the quitter stops . Moreover, if T is suﬃciently large, then, with
high probability, player j does not know whether he is the quitter, punisher or
a regular player, and he cannot infer which of the other players is more likely
to be the quitter. Therefore, player j can't earn much by stopping before stage
lˆ. Observe that when the quitter deviates and does not stop. his punisher, say
player i, does not know that he is a punisher. When player j has to stop, he
believes that he is the quitter (assuming m ∈ M\M ′). This implies that the
players -best-respond at all stages including while (unknowingly) punishing,
and that xF is a perfect -equilibrium in G(F,D) conditioned on ω ∈ Ω\E ′
and given m ∈M\M ′.
7.5 cF = simple
If for every i ∈ I: αiF ≤ 0, then the proﬁle in which all the players always
continue is an equilibrium in Ω\E ′. Otherwise, the fact that cF = simple
implies that there is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(DF × I) such that for each i ∈ I:
(1) θ(d, i) > 0⇒ Ri{i},d = αiF . (2) αiF +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DF
θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiF − . In
this case, one can use a procedure similar to the one described in the previous
subsection, to construct a perfect -equilibrium in G(F,D) conditioned on
ω ∈ Ω\E ′ and given m ∈M\M ′.
8 Equilibrium's Special Properties in Speciﬁc Cases
In this Section we present a few examples of speciﬁc kinds of stopping game,
with applicative interest, and we shortly discuss the special properties of the
perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in those cases.
(1) Symmetric stopping games: Stopping games where the payoﬀ process








, where Si↔j is the coalition derived from S by
substituting players i and j ). As can be seen from the construction in Sect.
7, such games admit a symmetric perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
(2) Eventual continuation Games: Stopping games where late enough in the
21
game each player would rather continue forever than stop alone. That




≤ RiS,∞,hS∞ . Such games admit a perfect Nash-equilibrium:
Players play the perfect Nash equilibrium of the ﬁnite game that ends at
N0 with an absorbing payoﬀ of RiS,∞,hS∞(where S is the set of players who
have not stopped until stage N0), and continue forever afterwords.
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